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AN INROAD UPON FIDUCIARY INTEGRITY
T is a principle universally recognized throughout our system of
law, that no person shall be permitted to occupy a position of
trust and confidence who at the same time is clearly subject to influ-
ences hostile to a faithful performance of his trust. There is a rule
as old as Chrigtianity, and it has been incorporated into our law
from the earliest times, that "no man shall serve two masters; for
either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will -hold to the
one and despise the other." Fiduciary relations can rest upon no
foundation but absolute integrity. Once destroy the inviolate sanc-
tity of the trust relation and the moral basis for social institutions
will begin to crumble away. The law has, in this particular, been
ever vigilant to ward off the least encroachment upon the high
:'andards of conduct exacted from those-who hold positions of trust
and confidence.
Bilt the temptations to dishonesty are necessarily so great, even
under the most favored conditions, that the law will not even per-
iiit the trustee to be placed in a situation which has an intrinsic
,,Idency to encourage unfaithfulness. It makes io difference, that
fe trustee may be honest and intend no default. Public policy
de&nands that the temptation itself be removed so far as possible, in
order to throw an additional and needed safeguard about the per-
formance of trust duties. An agent may not deal with himself; an
agent to sell may not at the same time, and in respect to the same
property, be an agent to buy; an executor may not purchase at his
own sale; a trustee r'iay not invest trust funds in his own business
nor mingle them with his own funds; a judge may not sit in his
own case; even a notary may not so much as take an acknowledg-
ment when he has the slightest interest in the subject matter of the
instrument. In none of these cases will it suffice to show that no
fraud resulted nor loss occurred. The law looks deeper than the
immediate results,of the particular case; it looks to the underlying
tendencies of the situation and pronounces thei dangerous and
fraught with evil consequences. Therefore it prohibits the situation
itself.
In the light of these well recognized principles of legal morality,
what answer should be given to the following question, which is the
particular subject of the present article?-
MaIy an adninistrator or executor be permitted to show that he
cannot collect a debt due front himself?
An administrator (and for the purposes of this discussion the
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
term may be considered as synonymous with executor) who is at
the same time a debtor, occupies inconsistent and antagonistic oosi-
tions. As administrator it is his duty to collect the debt; as debtor
it is to his interest to avoid its payment. If he .can persuade himself
as administrator that as debtor he is unable to' pay, he may save the
amount of the debt. There is no one to question his course. He is
the person appointed and designated by law to collect nd adminis-
ter all debts due the estate. No one can suk him. He who owes the
debt is the only person authorized to enforce its collection.
A situation such as this would seem to fall clearly within the
general principles already outlined. It would seem to be governed
by such a case as Everhart v. Searle," where the court says: "He
that is entrusted with the interests of others cannot be allowed to
make the business an object of interest to himself, because, from a
frailty of nature, one who has the power will be too readily seized
with the inclination to use the opportunity for serving his own inter-
est at the .expense of those for whonq he is interested. The danger
of temptation from the facility and advantage of doing wrong which
a particular situation affords does, out of the mere necessity, work
a disqualification."
As a fact there is a hopeless conflict among the cases upon this
question. It seems to be an instance of hard cases making much
bad law.
i The leading case in this country is Stevens v. Gaylord.2 In this
cdse, Which has been cited in almost every case upon the question
decided since the year 1814, the court says : "It is well settled, that
when the creditor makes his debtor executor, it is a discharge of the
action for the debt. * * * It is not always 'a release or extinguish-
ment of the debt; for it is assets' to pay creditors, if wanted for that
purpose. It is also assets to pay legacies, or distribute among the
next of kin, when the debt is not itself given as a legacy to the
executor. It seems more correct to say that although the duty
ifemains'in some cases, and for sorhe purposes, yet the right of action'
Is always discharged; because the executor cannot sue himdelf. * * *
e reason, it is obvious, applies with equal force to an adminis-
t rator. * * * As soon as the debtor is appointed adniministrator, it.
e acknowledges the debt, he has actually received so much. money,l
and is answerable for it. This is the result with respect to an execu-
tor; and the same reason applies to an administrator; as the samd.
hand is to receive and pay, and there is no ceremony "to be performed
in paying the debt,.and no made of doing it, but by considering the
x 71 Pa. St. 261.
2 1Z Mass. 256.
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money to be -now in the hands of the party, in his character' of
administrator. * * * The consequence is that he and his sureties in
the admihistiation bond are liable for the amount, of such a debt, in
the manner as if he had received- it from any other debtor of the
deceased."
In the following year, in Winship v. Bass,' CHIEF JusTicE PARKER
restated and follow;ed the satme rule, and in Ipswich Mfg. Co. v.
Story,4 CHIEF JUSTIcE SHAW, in stating the rule, said: "In other
Wi'ords, the debt becomes, prinia facie, assets in the' hands of the
administrator or executor, to be accobnted for and adjusted in pro-
bate account, as assets actually realized." And in Kinney v. Ensign,
5
the same great judge said: "On technical grounds, as well as on
considerations of policy, an administrator is not permitted to show
that he could not collect a debt due from himself." Later cases ip
'Massachusetts, such as Benchley v. Chapin,( Letand v. Fefton,7
Chapin v. Vatcrs s and Tarbell v. Jewett,' have established this rule
as the settled law of that state..
In 'Maine the same rule has been announced, upon the authority
of the -Massachusetts cases. 13tit the qualification noted in Stevens
v. Gaylord, supr-a; that the debt must be acknowledged, has not met
with .the approval of that court. Hodge v. Hodge.'0
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has followed the same rule.
Chick v. Farr". is a very exhaustive review of South Caroliha
authorits. no less than seventeen cases upon the question being dis-
cussed at length, showing that no doubt has ever been ,entertained
in that state as to the coirectness of the Massachusetts ruile. To the
same effect is Newman v. Clyburn.' -
Georgia and Louisiana, in Thompson v. Thompson,13 Succession
of Ba.le3.' 4 Fuselier v. Babineau,15 and Boyce v. Davis8 have
approved the same doctrire. In Wisconsin, some d6ubt as to the
correctness of the MassaThusetts rule was suggested in Lynch v.
Dihan,"r but that case. in so far as it touched upon that question,
.Mass. 99.
4.5 'Metc. (--Mass.)-31o.
, s8 Pick. (Mass.) 232.
0 Xo Cush. (Mass.) 176.




1t31 S. C: 473.
1241 S. L. 534.
"77 Ga. 692.
143o La. Ann. 75.
1:it La. Ann. 394.
13 'La. Ann. S55.
'r66 Wis. 490.
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was specifically overruled in Estate of Robinson v. Hodgkin ;18 and
in Iowa, in the case of Ka-ster v. Pierson,"9 the reasons- upon which
the -ule rests are very clearly stated by the Supreme Court. Finally,
the English Court of King's Bench, speaking by LORD TENTFRD*N,
Chief Justice, expressed its approval of the same doctrine in the case
of Freakley v. FoX.
20
The fact remains to be noted, however, that in" these cases the
point was never raised as to whether insolvency on the part of the
administrator would render the rule inoperative, so as to relieve the
sureties on his official bond. In all of them, nevertheless, the rule
was stated in general terms.
But the point has been raised in a considerable number of cases,
and while many courts have refused to allow this feature to affect the
rule, other courts have made an exception under such circumstances.
It is here that hard cases have made bad law. Tenderness for the
sureties on the administrator's bond has induced many courts to
engraft upon a most wholesome rule an exception which lets in just
the.mischiefs which the rule was designed to keep out.
An exception of this nature holds out a strong inducement to
unscrupulous administrators to feign insolvency or to put them-
selves temporarily in that condition, as a means of perpetrating a
fraud upon the estate. Estates of decedents are notoriously subject
to be preyed upon .by dishonest trustees. They should be guarded-
by the courts with peculiar care..
The necessity for rigorous rules in this regard has been felt and
expressed by many of the courts before which it has been sought to
plead insolvency as a ground of exemption from strict accountabil-
ity. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Masot's Estate,
21 said on
this question: "Every reason for this doctrine [that the debt be
deemed realized assets] is strengthened when liability on the ground
of the executor's insolvency is sought to be evaded. That is a mat-
ter which the beneficiaries of the estate are entitled, under every
principle of right and justice, to have determined by the ordinary
processes of the law in a proceeding where the debtor does not
occupy the conflicting relations of a representative' of the estate
charged with the duty of diligence in its behalf, and a debtor whose
interest it would be to avoid payment. An inquiry of that nature in
the county court, sitting for the transaction of probate business,
would necessarily be attended with innumerable difficulties, and
'S 99 WiS. 327.
1027 Ia. 90.
209 B. & C. 130.
2142 Ore. 177.
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would be an unsatisfactory and imperfect substitute for the remedies
ordinarily afforded for the collection of debts." Similar language is
used by the Supreme Court of Ohio in McGaughey v. Jacoby,2 2 in
connection with a very able and thorough discussion of the whole
subject.
A particularly vigorous opinion on this question is that in Treweek
v. Howard,23 "'.endered by Department One of the Supreme Court of
California in x895. The court says: -"This debt was as money in the
hands of the executor, and, as such, was a part of the estate for the
due administration of which the sureties became liable, just as they
did for the residue thereof. The poverty or riches of the principal, the
condition of the estate, where and how invested, were proper sub-
jects of inquiry for the sureties in. determining whether or not to
become responsible, but cannot be urged as reasons to excuse them
from the liability which they assumed. Nor can the representation
of their principal as to his financial position, or his failur6 so to do,
avail the sureties. Should such circumstances prevail to release
stireties, it is apprehended few would be bound. * * * The case
serves to illustrate the wisdom of Solomon, where he says (Pro-
verbs, xi., 15) 'He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it,
and he that hatetti suretyshipis sure.'" But in spite of this sound
and sensible view, so unambiguously expressed, the court, in Depart-
ment Two, squarely reversed itself only three years later, in the
case of Estate of Walker.24  Truly sureties are favorites of the" law!
In California, as well as in some other states, such as Ohio, New
York, and Oregon, the general rule has been deemed of such vital
importance that the legislature has put it in the mandatory form of a
statute. Nevertheless, the courts in two of these states, have, by
construction, so changed the scope and character of the statute as
to lirhit its application to cases of solvent administrators.
Five other states, in whose courts the question has been presented,
have squarely asserted the sound doctrine that insolvency on the part
of the administrator in no wise militates against the general rule.
In Alabama, through a series of no less than ten decisions, that able
court has consistently maintained that the fiduciary character of the
administrator's position demands a rigid safeguarding of absolute
integrity under all circumstances.23 An equally strict construction
254 Ohio St. 487. See also James v. %Vest, 67 Ohio St. 487.
21os Cal. 434.
2- 125 Cal. 242.
23 Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752; Duffez v. Buchanan, 8 Ala. 27; Purdom z,. Tipton,
9 Ala. 914; Whitlock's Adm'r. v. Whitlock's Creditors, 25 Ala. 54.3; Ragland v. Calhoun,
36 Ala- 606; Sewell v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 592; Flinn v. Carter, 59 Ala. 364; Miller v.
Irby's Adm'r., 63 Ala. 477; Wright v. Lang, 66 Ala. 389; Arnold i'. Arnold, 124 Ala. 55o.
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of fiduciary morality-hks been approved by the courts of North Car-
olina,26 Maryland, 27 Kentucky,28 and. New Hampshire.
In the state last above named the cases are of especial interest.
Norris v. Towle,20 was a case in which it was sought to obtain a
ruling upon this question, but the court held that the question was
not properly before it and wisely refused to pass upon it. But in
1896 the question was directly presented in Judge of Probate v. Sul-
loway,30 and the court said, in the course of its opinion: ."He [the
Judge of Probate] has authority to determine whether the indebted-
ness exists, and the extent of it, and there his authority ends. If
the debt is admitted or found, the Judge of Probate has no choice-
he must charge it to the executor as a part of the assets belonging
to the estate. This duty is imperative. He cannot authorize the
executor to compromise with himself, nor has he any authority to
negotiate and compromise with the executor. It is wise that such
should be the law. If it were otherwise it would open a wide door
to fraud. 'On technical grounds, as well as on considerations of
policy, an administrator is not permitted to show that he could not
collect a debt due from himself.' SHAW, C. J., in Kinney v. Ensign,
18 Pick. 232, 236." And upon the plea that the bondsmen of the'
administrator should be permitted to show his insolvency in their
own defense, the court said: "In other words, when the executor
is solvent and able to pay, and no surety is needed, the surety is
responsible for the debt; but when the executor is'unable to pay and
a surety's liability would be valuable, the surety is not liable." And
the court considered this reductio ad absurdum a sufficient answer
to the. plea.-
In Pennsylvania, the reporter has introduced some uncertainty
as to the doctrine of Garber v. Commnonwealth,31 the only case in
that state where the question seems to have been raised.* In his
abstract of the argument, after stating the claim of the plaintiff" in
error, that the administrator, who was a debtor to the estate, could
not claim credit before the auditor for his debt, on account of his
own insolvency, this statement appears in brackets, "'Per curiam.-
He should have done so for the sake of his sureties." This is all
there is in the case relative to the point under discussion, and the
2o Gay v. Grant, iox N. C. 2n6.
27 Lambrcht v. State, 57 lid. 240.
-s Hickman v. Kamp's Adm'r., 3 Bush (Ky.) 2o.
20 54 N. H. 29o.
"o68 N. H. 5tx.
"17 Barr, 265.
* In Eichelberger t,. 'Morris, 6 Watts (Pa.) 42, and Simon v'. Albright, 12 S. & R. (Pa.)
429, the general rule was stated.
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case is perhaps hardly vorthy of mention except for the fact that
it has been cited by one or two other courts as an a'uthority for the
rule that insolvency is a defense to a debtor who becomes adminis-
trator of his creditor's estate.
Prior to the year 1902, the real weight of the authority support-
ing the limitation of the rule to cases of solvent administrators, was
very slight and unsatisfactory. Wehave already noted the decision
of Department Two of the Supreme Court of California, in Estate
of Walker,3 2 squarely in opposition to the opinion of Department
One in Treweek v. Howard.33 A feeble attempt was made in the
later case to distinguish it from the earlier, on the ground that one
was an instance of an execvwor while-the other was an instance of
an administrator. But the two are substantially in direct conflict,
leaving the two departments of that state completely at variance.
Two New Jersey cases, Harker v. Irick,4 and Ordinary v. Ker-
shaw, 3  are frequentlv cited in support of the qualified rule. Neither
case, however,, was decided by the highest court of that state. Each
was the decision of a single judge, the decision in the Harker case
being rendered by the Chancellor and that in the other being ren-
dered by the Ordinary. Neither case was appealed. Furthermore,
an examination bf each case shows -the doctrine in this point to be
a mere obiter dictin.
Although New York has spread the- general rule upon its statute
books, yet the limitation in question has been announced by the
courts of that state. Baitclis v. Barr6 was a case at Special Term.
JUSTIcE LANDON, who wrote the opinion, cited* only the two New
Jersey cases discussed above, the Pennsylvania case 'of Garber v.'
Commonwealth,37 already referred to, and a Missouri case to -be
presently mentioned. On appeal to the General Term no cases at
all were cited in the opinion affirming the decision below. And on
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the case was affirmed without any
opinion being written. Furthermore, this formal affirmance was
concurred in by a bare majority of the court, EARL, J., dissenting,
RuGER, Ch. J., not sitting, and ANDkiW, J., not voting.3
The Missouri case just ment ioned \vas fcCarty, v. Frazer.3 " It
was based expressly upon the peculiar wording of the Missouri stat-
32 125 Cal. 242.
3 zo5 Cal. 434.
31 io N. J. Eq. 269.
' 4 N. J. Eq. 527.
"'45 Hun. (N. Y.) 582.
377 Barr, 265.
38 Baucus z. tarr, 107 N. Y. 624.
"1 62 Mo. 263.
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ute, though the court declared obiter that, in its opinion, no matter
how the statute might have read, the sureties of an insolvent execu-
tor could not have been held liable, "unless indeed the creative fac-
ulty be accorded to our lawmakers or the touch of Midas to their
enactments."
In Indiana, also, the court has stated an opinion favoring the
qualified rule, but it was purely and confessedly obiter.40
Two cases, one in Vermont4 and the other in Tennessee4- are
authoritative and unequivocal adjudications in support of exempting
an insolvent administrator from the operation of the rule. But the
Tennessee court cites no cases whatever, and the Vermont court
refers only to the cases cited in Baucus v. Barr at Special Term,
together with an early New York case.
But in the year 19o2 appeared the first opinion laying any claim
to thoroughness which supported the exemption of insolvent admin-
istrators. This was a commissioner's opinion in the case of In re
Howell's Estate.43 Most of the cases on each side of the question
are referred to, and the statements of text writers are liberally
quoted. The cases are not analyzed with care, but the case has
undoubtedly given, much additional strength to the view that if an
administrator can convince the Probate Court of his insolvency,
he can escape liability for the debt he owes to the estate.
The influence of this Nebraska case has already shown itself, in
a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan. This
is the case of Sanders v. Dodge.44 The court quotes more than half
of the long opinion in the Nebraska case, and decides the question
on the authority of the reasoning and cases appearing therein.
One other very recent case has announced the same view. The
case of Iickman v. Kamp's Adm'r.45 has already been referred to as
supporting a thorough-going application of the general rule, weak-
ened by no limitations. In 19o4, in the case of Buckel v. Smith's
Adm'r.,48 the court suggested its approval of the rule as qualified,
making insolvency of the administrator a defense to an action
against his sureties. Curiously, the Hickman case is not referred to,
and the court says that. the question of liability in the case of an
insolvent administrator does not seem to have been raised in that
state. The case is not particularly well reasoned, and smacks some-
-0 State v. Gregory, fl9 Ind.-5o3.
41 Lyon v. Osgood, 58 Vt. 70 .
4. Murray v. Luna, 86 Tenn. 326.
43 (Nebr.), 92 N. W. 76o.
44 (Mich. 1905), 103 N. V. 597-
13 3 Bush (Ky.) 205.
4182 S. V. zoo.
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what of obiter dictum, inasmuch as the court says that the adminis-
trator in fact seemed to have money enough to pay. But it probably
indicates the rule which is now to be enforced in Kentucky.
Three states, Nebraska, 'Michigan and Kentucky, are thus seen
to have adopted the qualified rule of liability, within the last four
years. The only reason, independent of statute, suggested in any
case which advocates that view. is the hardship upon the sureties.
This does not seem a sufficient justification for relaxing the safe-guards which the law deems so essential for the preservation of the
trust relation. The principles of equity prescribe, in the interests
of an enlightened public policy, that no person, who occupies a
position of trust and confidence, shall be permilted at the same time
to sustain such personal relations to the subject matter of the trust,
that self-interest can become a direct cohipetitor with the most scrup-
ulous fidelity. Any departure from this wholesome principle is too
likely to open the door to fraud.
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND.
UNIVRSITy OF MICHIGAN.
